Proportionality and the mathematics of elections

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Valmatematik

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Introduction

The basic problem I will discuss for the first half today is the following:

 Given votes for different parties in an election, how should one proportionally determine the number of seats each party should get in the parliament.

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Introduction

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- Given votes for different parties in an election, how should one proportionally determine the number of seats each party should get in the parliament.
- A very similar question, well studied in the USA, is:
 - Given the size of the population in the various states. How many seats should they each have in the house of representatives?

This later question has become known as the problem of **apportionment**.

Notation

Fix notation

- M := total number of seats
- P := total size of population
- $p_i :=$ population in state *i*

 m_i will be the number of seats given to state i

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- First each state gets as many seats as the integer part of τ_i .
- Then the remaining $M \sum_i \lfloor \tau_i \rfloor$ seats are given to the states with largest decimal part of τ_i .

Example 1			
State	А	В	С
P P	14%	43%	43%

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This is known as the **Alabama-paradox**, because it threatened Alabama in 1880.

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	Year 1900			Year 1	901		
State	p _i	$ au_{i}$	m _i		pi	$ au_i$	m _i
Virginia	1,854,184	9.599	10				
Maine	694, 4130	3.595	3				
Total	74,562,608		386				

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Note that Virgina grew more than Maine both in absolute terms (19,767 vs. 4,648) and in relative terms (+1.1% vs. +0.7%). Still Virgina lost one seat to Maine!

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Reason: "The 1,000,000 people are a little more than the 5 seats."

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Comparison	$47.6(\frac{333}{7})$	47.4	43.3	Seat 7 to A
Seats	4	2	1	Final apportionment

Motivation for Webster

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Population	333	237	130

One way to motivate Webster's method is to compare states pairwise. Assume we know state C should have one seat.

States A and B shall then share 6 seats and have together 570 inhabitants. Each seat is thus worth $\frac{333+237}{6} = 95$ people.

Seats:	1	2	3	4	5	6
Pop:	95	190	285	380	475	570

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Pop:	95	190	237.5	285	332.5	380	475	570

State A is just above 3.5 seats and "should" be rounded up. State B is just below 2.5 seats and "should" be rounded down. What we saw on the previous slide was

$$333 > \frac{333+237}{6} \cdot 3.5$$
 and $237 < \frac{333+237}{6} \cdot 2.5$.

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Or, equivalently $\frac{333}{3.5} > \frac{333+237}{6} > \frac{237}{2.5}$ or $\frac{333}{7} > \frac{237}{5}$, which is exactly the comparison made by Webster's method.

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thich is exactly the comparison made by Webster's method.

A great advantage is of course that all these pairwise comparisons can be made simultaneously.

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Historically there are five divisor methods.

Name			Formula			
Webster	$\frac{1}{2}$	<u>3</u> 2	<u>5</u> 2	<u>7</u> 2	<u>9</u> 2 · · ·	$m + \frac{1}{2}$

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Name			Formula			
Webster Jefferson (d'Hondt)	1 2 1	³ 2 2	5 2 3	7 2 4	<u>9</u> 2 · · · 5 · · ·	$\begin{vmatrix} m+rac{1}{2}\\m+1 \end{vmatrix}$

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Name			Formula			
Adams	″0″	1	2	3	4	m
	-					
Webster	$\frac{1}{2}$	3	5	$\frac{7}{2}$	$\frac{9}{2}$	$m + \frac{1}{2}$
Jefferson (d'Hondt)	1	³ 2 2	ŝ	4	9 <u>2</u> 5	m+1

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Name			Formula			
Adams	″0″	1	2	3	4	m
Dean	″0″	<u>4</u> 3	<u>12</u> 5	<u>24</u> 7	$\frac{40}{9}$	$m+\frac{m}{2m+1}$
Webster Jefferson (d'Hondt)	1 2 1	<u>3</u> 2 2	5 <u>2</u> 3	7 2 4	9 <u>2</u> 5	$\begin{vmatrix} m+\frac{1}{2}\\ m+1 \end{vmatrix}$

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Adams	″0″	1	2	3	4	m
Dean	″0″	$\frac{4}{3}$	<u>12</u> 5	<u>24</u> 7	$\frac{40}{9}$	$m + \frac{m}{2m+1}$
Huntington-Hill	″0″	$\sqrt{2}$	$\sqrt{6}$	$\sqrt{12}$	$\sqrt{20}\dots$	$\sqrt{m(m+1)}$
Webster	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{3}{2}$	$\frac{5}{2}$	$\frac{7}{2}$	$\frac{9}{2}$	$m + \frac{1}{2}$
Jefferson (d'Hondt)	Ī	Ź	3	ā	5	$m + \bar{1}$

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Historically there are five divisor methods.

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Adams	″0″	1	2	3	4	т
Dean	″0″	$\frac{4}{3}$	<u>12</u> 5	<u>24</u> 7	$\frac{40}{9}$	$m + \frac{m}{2m+1}$
Huntington-Hill	″0″	$\sqrt{2}$	$\sqrt{6}$	$\sqrt{12}$	$\sqrt{20}\dots$	$\sqrt{m(m+1)}$
Webster	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{3}{2}$	$\frac{5}{2}$	$\frac{7}{2}$	$\frac{9}{2}$	$m + \frac{1}{2}$
Jefferson (d'Hondt)	1	Ž	ā	4	5	$m+\bar{1}$

They are ordered so Adams is best for small states and Jefferson best for large states.

Some US history

- 1792 1830 Jefferson
- 1840 Webster
- 1850 1870 Hamilton
- 1880 1910 Hamilton and Webster
- 1930 Huntington-Hill

Fierce debate in the 1920's wether to use Webster-Wilcox or Huntington-Hill.

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1948 another NAS group (Eisenhart, Morse, von Neumann) also suggested H-H.

It is not so difficult to see that all divisor methods avoid the three paradoxes presented. But the following converse is also true.

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Theorem (Balinski - Young)

A method which avoids the population paradox is equivalent to some divisor method.

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Balinski- Young wrote a large number of papers on this topic and gathered their conclusions in a book 1983.

Their conclusion was: Webster is the most fair method!

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Quota requirement

A property we would like to have is the **quota requirement** $|\tau_i - m_i| < 1$ for all *i*.

Hamilton's method clearly satisfy this.

(I) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1)) < ((1))

A property we would like to have is the **quota requirement** $|\tau_i - m_i| < 1$ for all *i*.

Hamilton's method clearly satisfy this.

Theorem (Balinski - Young)

No divisor method can guarantee the quota requirement.

However, it is in practice violated very rarely by Webster's method.